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INTRODUCTION
Street harassment is a common occurrence in the lives of women
in the United States. In the last two decades, scholars have discussed
how best to define the phenomenon, which essentially involves men
publicly commenting on the physical appearance and presence, in
public space, of women they do not know. This Note begins from the
premise that street harassment is not just a precursor to sexual vio-
lence, but is itself a violent act on a continuum of gender-based and
sexual violence against women. The Note then explores existing legal
frameworks, both civil and criminal, through which victims of street
harassment may seek redress. These existing frameworks largely fail
to redress the harms suffered by victims of street harassment because
of the uniquely stranger-based feature of the act, the requirement
of a perpetrator’s intent to harm, and the gendered nature of both
the act and its harms.
Criminal law could be the most effective method of reducing street
harassment, but existing criminal laws fail to adequately remedy the
harms suffered by victims. In support of this proposition, this Note
analyzes current criminal laws in six U.S. states with major cities.
This method of analysis is based on the fact that street harassment is
most likely to occur in urban areas. This Note concludes with a policy
proposal based on a recent anti-street harassment ordinance enacted
in Kansas City, Missouri. The proposal is designed to minimize the
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collateral consequences of involvement with the criminal processing
system while providing redress for victims of street harassment.
I. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON STREET HARASSMENT
A. Definition
Street harassment is a term of art that describes a variety of
“verbal and nonverbal behavior[s]” conducted by one stranger and
directed at another.1 Street harassment violates what sociologists
define as the “normal relationship between strangers on [a] street”—
the norm of “civil inattention.” 2 In other words, social norms dictate
that strangers typically ignore each other in public space. Those who
street harass, however, engage in a variety of behaviors to give atten-
tion not normally given to strangers. Street harassment occurs pri-
marily in urban areas, but is not divided by a North/South or other
geographic line.3 The urban concentration of this behavior makes
sense given that cities, unlike rural areas, have sidewalks and public
transit that allow people to move through public space instead of re-
maining within the—relatively private—confines of an automobile.
A variety of verbal behaviors may constitute street harassment,
including, but not limited to, catcalls, comments—sexual or non-
sexual—on a woman’s physical appearance or her presence in public
(e.g., “Hey baby”), vulgar suggestions, threats, other crude language,
innuendos, and sexist comments.4 Nonverbal behaviors may also con-
stitute street harassment; these include, but again are not limited to,
whistling, leering, making vulgar/crude gestures, groping, pinching,
staring, and following.5 The “pervasive myth[ ]” that street harassment
is perpetrated solely by men of “low” social class against women with
a certain appearance or style of dress is not supported by empirical
1. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 523 (1993).
2. LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE
PUBLIC SPEECH 31 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE [sic] (1963)).
3. Bowman, supra note 1, at 529.
4. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 44; Bowman, supra note 1, at 523; Kavita B.
Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A Study
of the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 318 (2011); Bunkosal Chhun, Note,
Catcalls: Protected Speech or Fighting Words?, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 273, 276 (2011);
Tiffanie Heben, Article, A Radical Reshaping of the Law: Interpreting and Remedying
Street Harassment, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 183, 187–88 (1994).
5. Bowman, supra note 1, at 523; Janet K. Swim et al., Everyday Sexism: Evidence
for Its Incidence, Nature, and Psychological Impact from Three Daily Diary Studies, 57
J. SOC. ISSUES 31, 37 (2001); Chhun, supra note 4, at 277; Heben, supra note 4, at 187–88.
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research.6 Women may be harassed on the street regardless of their
clothing or physical appearance,7 by men of any race or social class.8
Street harassment is rarely about the harasser’s genuine interest in
developing a relationship with the target.9 Even if it was, it is an in-
effective, and counterproductive way to display affection because, as
explained below, most targets react negatively and experience harm
as a result of the harassment.10
Street harassment is a “gender-specific injury.”11 A defining char-
acteristic of street harassment is that harassers are male, and targets
(those to whom the harassing behavior is directed) are female.12 This
means that street harassment is performed so that women are harmed
in ways that men are not.13 Street harassment is an expression of
male dominance over women.14 It is linked to a “broader hierarch[y]”
6. CAROL BROOKS GARDNER, PASSING BY: GENDER AND PUBLIC HARASSMENT 89 (1995).
7. Chhun, supra note 4, at 282. Thompson notes, the idea that street harassment
is the result of a women’s provocative dress harms women by controlling what they are
socially permitted to wear, and harms men by perpetuating the falsehood that they can-
not control themselves, or their sexual urges. Deborah M. Thompson, “The Woman in the
Street:” Reclaiming the Public Space from Sexual Harassment, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
313, 317 (1994).
8. Cheryl Benard & Edith Schlaffer, The Man in the Street: Why He Harasses, in
FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS BE-
TWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 72 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 1984);
GARDNER, supra note 6, at 109.
9. See MARTHA J. LANGELAN, BACK OFF! HOW TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 40 (1993).
10. Id. at 39.
11. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Street Harassment as Sexual Subordination: The Phenom-
enology of Gender-Specific Harm, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 167, 168 (1997).
12. HOLLY KEARL, STOP STREET HARASSMENT: MAKING PUBLIC PLACES SAFE AND
WELCOMING FOR WOMEN 11 (2010) (noting that over 99 percent of the 811 female respon-
dents to her informal survey “had experienced some form of street harassment . . . .”);
Bowman, supra note 1, at 523; Ross Macmillan, Annette Nierobisz & Sandy Welsh,
Experiencing the Streets: Harassment and Perceptions of Safety Among Women, 37 J.
RESEARCH, CRIME & DELINQUENCY 306, 307 (2000); Olatokunbo Olukemi Laniya, Street
Smut: Gender, Media, and the Legal Power Dynamics of Street Harassment, or “Hey Sexy”
and Other Verbal Ejaculations, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 101 (2005) (citing Elizabeth
Arveda Kissling, Street Harassment: The Language of Sexual Terrorism, 2 DISCOURSE &
SOC’Y 451, 453 (1991)); see also Heben, supra note 4, at 186–87 (stating that “ ‘[s]treet ha-
rassment occurs when one or more unfamiliar men accost one or more women’ ” (emphasis
added) (quoting Michaela di Leonardo, Political Economy of Street Harassment, AEGIS,
Summer 1981, at 51)). Age, socioeconomic status, race, and education of the harasser are
not correlated with whether men harass women on the street, but younger men may be
louder and/or more aggressive about their harassing behavior than older men. Benard &
Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 72 (emphasis added); Bowman, supra note 1, at 531.
13. See Deirdre Davis, The Harm that Has No Name: Street Harassment, Embodiment,
and African American Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 144–45 (1994). This may ex-
plain why men underestimate how frequently women are street harassed. See NIELSEN,
supra note 2, at 78.
14. See Jennifer L. Berdahl, Harassment Based on Sex: Protecting Social Status in the
Context of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 641, 641 (2007). Berdahl suggests
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of sex and gender,15 and is, like other forms of sexual harassment, an
expression of power.16 In particular, street harassment conveys the
message that women are persons open for male commentary.17 That
men feel comfortably entitled to make lewd and unwelcome com-
ments at women who are strangers to them reinforces the notion that
women are perceived as less worthy of respect than men, are held in
lesser regard than men, and occupy a lower social status than men
on the basis of their sex.18
While street harassment is primarily a gender-based harm, race
also shapes targets’ reactions to it.19 Women of all races are targeted
by street harassers, but may be targeted differently or may interpret
harassment differently on the basis of the target’s race.20 For Black
women in particular, street harassment involves an intersection of
race and gender.21 This stems from the history of oppression that is
unique to Black women’s experiences with sexual victimization and
violence within the slavery context.22 White male slave-holders fab-
ricated characterizations of Black women as sexually promiscuous
to justify the sexual subordination and abuse of enslaved women.23
Today, Black women may be stereotyped as “sexually accessible” and
may feel this stereotype reinforced when strangers, especially men,
make sexualized comments or gestures to them in public,24 particu-
larly when White men’s sexual comments are combined with racist
statements.25 In sum, “when African-American women are harassed
that while all sexual harassment is an expression of male dominance over women, “[m]en
who endorse male dominance are more likely than others to sexually harass and those who
challenge male dominance are more likely to be harassed.” Id. at 641 (internal citation
omitted). In other words, women whom men perceive as posing a threat to gender-based
power are more likely to be targets of harassment. Id. See also di Leonardo, supra note
12, at 55.
15. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 17.
16. LANGELAN, supra note 9, at 38.
17. See Elizabeth Arveda Kissling & Cheris Kramarae, Stranger Compliments: The
Interpretation of Street Remarks, 14 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 75, 75 (1991) (citing Carol
Brooks Gardner, Passing by: Street Remarks, Address Rights, and the Urban Female, 50
SOC. INQUIRY 328–56 (1980)).
18. Pam McAllister, Wolf Whistles and Warnings, 6 HERESIES 37, 39 (1978). Kissling
and Kramarae argue that “[e]ven ostensibly complimentary remarks . . . and violations of
personal space can remind a woman of her gender identity as woman, subject to evaluation
as a sexual object in a way that men are not, and vulnerable to invasions of privacy and
physical space.” Kissling & Kramarae, supra note 17, at 76 (internal citation omitted).
19. Bowman, supra note 1, at 532.
20. Id.
21. Davis, supra note 13, at 162.
22. Id. at 163; Ramakrishnan, supra note 4, at 320.
23. Davis, supra note 13, at 166–67.
24. Ramakrishnan, supra note 4, at 319–20.
25. Heben, supra note 4, at 197–98.
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on the street, the experience evokes a long history of disrespect, deg-
radation, and inhumane sexual mistreatment to which Black women
have been subjected over the years.” 26
The intersection of race and gender with respect to street harass-
ment is not limited to the experiences of Black women. Race may
also affect White women’s perceptions of safety when they are street
harassed;27 Heben notes that “the myth of the [B]lack rapist influ-
ences the way in which [W]hite women interpret sexual harassment
from men of color.” 28 Additionally, Asian women may view street
harassment as a reminder of the stereotype of Asian female sub-
missiveness.29 Race and gender thus intertwine to shape women’s
experiences with street harassment.
B. Social and Psychological Harm
Street harassers may view their behavior as complimentary or
trivial.30 Men who harass women on the street provide a variety of ex-
planations for their behavior. For example, in Benard and Schlaffer’s
study of street harassment, male survey respondents said that they
call out to women on the street because it is “fun,” because it “doesn’t
hurt anybody,” because it alleviates their boredom, because discuss-
ing women with other men facilitates bonding and friendship, and/or
because they believe that women find the attention complimentary.31
Some men could not articulate an explanation for their behavior.32
Only about fifteen percent of respondents reported that they were
actually intending to anger, hurt, or harass women, but these respon-
dents tended to be the ones who had engaged in threats or graphic
26. Bowman, supra note 1, at 533–34. Heben adds that “[f]or African American women,
hundreds of years of domination add meaning to the sexual comments of [W]hite men;
those same words would not have the same meaning for [W]hite women.” Heben, supra
note 4, at 196.
27. See Heben, supra note 4, at 196.
28. Id. at 197. Stated differently, the stereotype that Black men are sexually violent
may cause White women to experience greater fear of being victimized by Black harassers
than by White harassers. Id. at 196.
29. Id. at 196.
30. Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 70; McAllister, supra note 18, at 37. Harassers’
sense that street remarks are complimentary may be bolstered by anecdotal evidence that
some women feel the same way. See, e.g., Nikki Gloudeman, Confession: I’m a Feminist
Who’s Flattered by Catcalling, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2015, 9:33 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/nikki-gloudeman/feminist-flattered-by-catcalling_b_6488382.html
[http://perma.cc/QT6U-CBA8] (describing how the author’s experiences with being cat-
called boosted her self-esteem and body image). Harassers may use stories of women who
claim to enjoy the attention of catcallers to support their own belief that their behavior
is not harmful to the women they target.
31. Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 71; McAllister, supra note 18, at 37.
32. Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 71.
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commentary when calling out to women.33 Men may also street harass
women to display their masculinity.34 Because “[g]ender, unlike sex,
is not biologically determined,” 35 and people generally feel that they
must behave in certain ways to demonstrate or “prove” their gender
identity to others,36 street harassment may serve as a way for men
to prove that they are male.37
Despite what harassers believe to the contrary, street harass-
ment creates a variety of harms for those who are harassed. Being
unique to women, who occupy a lower power status within the socially
constructed “gender hierarchy,” 38 the harms of street harassment are
not obviously visible in a culture dominated by masculine norms.39
Street harassment is nevertheless a form of gender-motivated sexual
violence,40 which represents one point on a continuum of violence
against women.41 While some scholars have suggested that “sexual
approach forms of harassment are motivated by” the harasser’s sex-
ual desire, as opposed to gender-based harassment being motivated
by sexism and animosity,42 this perspective is problematic because
it fails to create a unified understanding of both forms of harassment,
each expressed in street remarks, as a form of violence that serves
to keep women in a subordinate position relative to men.43
Scholars have conceptualized the social harms of street harass-
ment in different ways, but typically agree that it is a form of violent
social control. For example, Davis argues that street harassment,
like rape, is “a violent act of power occurring in a context limited to
particular individuals or situations,” 44 establishes male dominance
over women,45 and is a mechanism by which men invade women’s
privacy.46 Similarly, di Leonardo argues that street harassment is an
intrusion on a woman’s attention,47 a way for men to define women as
sexual objects,48 and a way for men to force unwanted interactions
33. Id.
34. KEARL, supra note 12, at 130.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 172.
39. Id.
40. See Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 72; Kissling & Kramarae, supra note 17,
at 88, 89.
41. Heben, supra note 4, at 202.
42. Berdahl, supra note 14, at 643.
43. Id.
44. Davis, supra note 13, at 140.
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id. at 144.
47. di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 52.
48. Id.
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on women.49 Kissling argues that street harassment creates an envi-
ronment of fear and “sexual terrorism,” where, much like political
terrorists, the perpetrators use fear to control their targets.50
Street harassment oppresses women by denying them the ability
to move about in public space free from commentary or intrusion by
others and from fear of victimization and male violence.51 It forces
women to alter their behavior to cope with the harassment of others
in ways that men need not do.52 Women’s behavioral alterations are
often a response to their fear of violence, particularly rape.53 “[F]ear
of rape is [not] universal among women,” but it does “significantly
restrict the activities of women.” 54 For example, the fear of rape stem-
ming from public harassment by strangers may restrict women’s
movements in public by altering where they feel safe to go.55 One
legal effect of this phenomenon is arguably a deprivation of women’s
liberty in public spaces if they no longer feel free to exercise their
right to travel.56 At least one court has recognized that women may
49. Id. (“[H]arassing men seek to force women to show them deference—if they don’t
receive ‘friendliness’ they will exact fearfulness.”).
50. Elizabeth Arveda Kissling, Street Harassment: The Language of Sexual Terrorism,
2 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 451, 456 (1991) (noting that street harassment is not a product of a
culture of gender-based control but instead works to create that culture and “[a]n environ-
ment of fear”) (emphasis omitted); accord Kissling & Kramarae, supra note 17, at 76
(internal citations omitted).
51. Davis, supra note 13, at 144–45.
52. Id. For example, in their study of how the gender of a survey respondent and of
a potential aggressor may influence the respondent’s perceptions of danger, Harris and
Miller found that female respondents reported a “greater degree of fear” with respect to
“being attacked by a stranger,” and believed that their risk of such an attack was higher,
than did men. Mary B. Harris & Kari C. Miller, Gender and Perceptions of Danger, 43
SEX ROLES 843, 857 (2000).
53. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 535. A woman doesn’t know which of her harassers
might turn into her rapist. Id.
54. Mark Warr, Fear of Rape Among Urban Women, 32 SOC. PROBS. 238, 248, 249
(1985).
55. See Kimberly Fairchild & Laurie A. Rudman, Everyday Stranger Harassment and
Women’s Objectification, 21 SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 338, 354 (2008). Kissling also argues
that women frame their responses to street harassment in terms of their fear of rape,
which is created by the street harassment itself. Kissling, supra note 50, at 456. Warr
found that “[f]ear of rape . . . appears to affect women most by dictating where and how . . .
they travel” but that there was no statistically significant effect of women’s fear of rape
on the likelihood that they would take precautionary measures to make their homes safer.
Warr, supra note 54, at 248. In other words, the fear of rape affected only women’s precau-
tionary behaviors in public spaces. Id.
56. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 343 n.191. The Supreme Court held in Kent v.
Dulles that “[t]he right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without the due process of law . . . .” 357 U.S. 1113, 1118 (1958). Of course, one
limitation of the “right to travel” argument with respect to street harassment is that no
state action exists where a woman feels deprived of the right to travel solely because of
street harassment by private actors.
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have stronger reasons than men to fear sexual violence.57 Though
that case did not address street harassment, the court noted that
“women are disproportionately victims of” sexual violence and thus
“have a stronger incentive” than men to be concerned with the poten-
tial threat posed by others’ unwanted sexual behavior toward them.58
Street harassment, thus, serves to reinforce socially constructed
gender roles and gender differences, as well as the gender-based power
hierarchy where women are viewed as subordinate to men and men
exert gender-based and sexual control over women.59 Street harass-
ment is not only a “personal problem” for the target, but a “social
problem” affecting power dynamics between men and women.60 When
men street harass women, they send the message that women are
not welcome in the public sphere and that public spaces are within
men’s exclusive control.61 Women’s very presence in public is seen
as a grant of permission for men to make public commentary on that
presence, their bodies, their sexuality, or their appearance.62 Unfor-
tunately, the legal system may reinforce this sense of male entitle-
ment over women’s bodies as well. For example, a District of Columbia
judge recently dismissed criminal charges against a man arrested for
taking “upskirt” photos of women sitting on the steps of the Lincoln
Memorial,63 reasoning that because the defendant did not go to great
57. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
58. Id.; see also Heben, supra note 4, at 211 (discussing Ellison and adding that “[r]efus-
ing to recognize that women hold legitimate claims and are under the constant threat of
sexual violence that affects their perspectives only serves to force women to endure further
victimization”); Thompson, supra note 7, at 321 (noting that because “[W]omen have no
way” to determine which strangers have “friendly” intentions and which have “harmful”
ones, some women assume that all men who approach them on the street may threaten
their safety).
59. See Berdahl, supra note 14, at 645 (noting that sex-based harassment may result
from a motivation to preserve the gender hierarchy); di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 56;
McAllister, supra note 18, at 37.
60. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 78. In one study, 75 percent of respondents said that
they believed that “sexually suggestive comments between strangers in public places
constitute[d] a social problem.” Id. This included 70 percent of male respondents and 78
percent of female respondents. Id. Both male and female respondents connected sexually
suggestive public speech to the subordination of women. Id. at 79–80. Only 26 percent
of respondents, however, thought that “sexually suggestive speech is the most serious
social problem . . . .” Id. at 83. On this measure, 74 percent of respondents thought that
racist public speech outranked sexually inappropriate public speech. Id.
61. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 526. Street harassment may make women feel unwel-
come and unsafe in public because once in public they are subjected to harassment in ways
that men are not. See id.; Laniya, supra note 12, at 107. Stranger harassment has a con-
sistent negative impact on women’s perceptions of safety in public. Macmillan, Nierobisz
& Welsh, supra note 12, at 319.
62. Chhun, supra note 4, at 281.
63. Order to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements at 2–3, United States v.
Cleveland (D.C. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 13-DVM 001341).
2015] THE PROBLEM OF STREET HARASSMENT 137
lengths to procure those images, the photographed women did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the view up their
skirts was already, in effect, on public display.64
Women who are street harassed may also experience physical
and psychological harms as a result of this behavior.65 Physical re-
sponses to street harassment may include nausea, vomiting, irregular
breathing, shaking, muscle tension, numbness, dizziness, increased
heart rate, and other physical stress responses.66 Some of the psy-
chological responses include anxiety, stress, humiliation, fear, shame,
embarrassment, lowered self-esteem,67 vulnerability, and a decreased
sense of personal safety.68 Street harassment may also trigger post-
traumatic stress from flashbacks to a previous sexual trauma,69 and
cause women to experience future sexual dysfunction and dissatisfac-
tion as a result of “self-conscious body monitoring, [and] body-based
shame and anxiety . . . .” 70
Street harassment stems in part from male objectification of
women;71 in turn, objectification may cause psychological damage
to women.72 Sexual objectification is a form of gender oppression,73
through which a woman is made to feel reduced to a sexual object.74
In sum, “[s]exual objectification occurs whenever a woman’s body,
body parts, or sexual functions are separated out from her person,
reduced to the status of mere instruments, or regarded as if they
were capable of representing her . . . .” 75 Women may internalize
harassers’ perceptions of their bodies, articulated through sexual
comments and gestures, and begin to see themselves the way they
perceive that men see them.76 Street harassment, as an explicit ex-
pression of male objectification of women, has the following effect:
64. Id.; see also Kate Dries, Judge: Lincoln Memorial Upskirt Photographer Didn’t
Break the Law, JEZEBEL (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://jezebel.com/judge-lincoln-memo
rial-upskirt-photographer-didnt-brea-1644766545?utm_campaign=socialfow_jezebel_twit
ter&utm_source=jezebel_twitter&utm_medium=socialflow [http://perma.cc/8F5C-8GQ7].
65. See Heben, supra note 4, at 201; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 189–90.
66. Heben, supra note 4, at 201.
67. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 186, 189–90.
68. See Macmillan, Nierobisz & Welsh, supra note 12, at 309; see also Bowman, supra
note 1, at 539; di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 56; McAllister, supra note 18, at 37.
69. Bowman, supra note 1, at 536.
70. Barbara L. Fredrickson & Tomi-Ann Roberts, Objectification Theory: Toward
Understanding Women’s Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks, 21 PSYCHOL. OF
WOMEN Q. 173, 189–90 (1997).
71. See id. at 173–74.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 174.
74. Heben, supra note 4, at 202.
75. Fredrickson & Roberts, supra note 70, at 175 (citation omitted).
76. Swim et al., supra note 5, at 49.
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“When we are harassed on the street a ‘simple’ comment barely
masks an explicit assertion of dominance. He says: ‘I like those legs.’
We hear: ‘I am male, therefore, I have the power to dissect you and
evaluate your parts, and that is what I am now doing.’ ” 77
Street harassment is not a “harmless nuisance,” 78 but is instead
a form of gender-based sexual violence with observable physical, psy-
chological, and social harms.79 The dominant group (men) has framed
the effects of street harassment differently—in terms of flattery, com-
pliments, and positive attention—than have its targets—women, who
describe it as fear-inducing harmful behavior.80 The dominant group’s
construction ignores the physical and psychological harms that result
from objectification.81 Women who are street harassed are dehuman-
ized, devalued, and “taught . . . to associate emotions of humiliation
and powerlessness with [their] identity as . . . sexual being[s]. Thus,
a woman is taught to accept, and silently endure, injuries as a defini-
tional part of her sexuality.” 82 Comparisons between injuries suffered
by street-harassed women and those suffered by men who are in-
sulted on the street are problematic because they eliminate discourse
about the harms of street harassment regarding sexual subordina-
tion, gender-based power hierarchies, and women’s oppression.83
II. NON-LEGAL ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS STREET HARASSMENT
On an individual level, women may adopt any number of strate-
gies to cope with street harassment. One is to purposefully ignore
or avoid an individual harasser.84 Fairchild and Rudman found that
passive coping strategies like avoidance or ignoring are more prevalent
among targets than are active coping strategies like confrontation.85
Women may also use other adaptive, nonconfrontational strategies
77. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 186.
78. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 16.
79. See Heben, supra note 4, at 201–02.
80. Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel Like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag, 61
UCLA L. REV. 566, 599 (2014) (“When a man claims that he would be delighted if the roles
were reversed in harassment, he is not actually thinking of what it is like to be a woman
walking down the street—he is thinking of what it is like to be a man walking down the
street, with all the physical security and social privilege that comes with being a man, en-
joying the compliments of what must surely be, in this scenario, women he does not find
repulsive or threatening.”).
81. Laniya, supra note 12, at 103.
82. Id.
83. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 181.
84. Bowman, supra note 1, at 537; Vicki J. Magley, Coping with Sexual Harassment:
Reconceptualizing Women’s Resistance, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 930, 930
(2002).
85. Fairchild & Rudman, supra note 55, at 353–54.
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like being “on guard” and constantly assessing the surroundings
to determine the likelihood of being street harassed in a particular
place.86 Some women may wish to avoid addressing the issue alto-
gether and instead dismiss any individualized instance of street
harassment as annoying behavior.87
Other women may address street harassment by confronting
their harassers or men who they observe harassing other women.
They may do so alone or with the support of an antiharassment or-
ganization such as Hollaback!: A Non-Profit and Movement to End
Street Harassment.88
Women may adopt a variety of confrontational strategies to
address street harassers directly. They may, for example, use non-
violent confrontational techniques that tell the harasser that the
behavior is unwanted and that avoid swearing, sarcasm, or insults.89
The target may also ask the harasser to explain his behavior in an
attempt to disarm him, regain control of the situation, and feel more
empowered.90 Women may also use an active bystander approach to
address street harassment of which they are not the direct target.91
Stop Street Harassment, a Virginia non-profit organization, sug-
gests several methods for bystanders to intervene when they notice
somebody else being street harassed.92 These methods include asking
the person being harassed: (1) if she is okay, (2) if she would like
86. KEARL, supra note 12, at 112. Being “on guard” may mean crossing the street to
avoid a potential harasser, wearing a blank or angry facial expression, avoiding eye con-
tact, talking—or pretending to talk—on a cell phone, wearing headphones, or choosing
an alternate route or method of transportation if the planned path or transit service ap-
pears to include a harasser. Id. at 114, 120. Women may also seek the protection of a male
escort. Harris & Miller, supra note 52, at 859. This method, however, forces women to rely
on men—ironically, for protection from other men—and reiterates a system of gender-based
power. di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 56.
87. Heben criticizes society taking this approach as keeping the status quo of gender-
based subordination of women intact. Heben, supra note 4, at 205.
88. Founded in 2009, Hollaback! encourages women to fight back against street harass-
ment using primarily non-legal methods, such as confronting the harasser and reporting
harassing behavior via the organization’s mobile application. See Kaelyn Forde, ‘Hey Baby!’:
Anti-catcalling Crusade Gains Ground in New York City, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 8,
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/8/catcalling-womennewyork.html [http://
perma.cc/H4YM-UK8K]. Hollaback!’s official website is http://www.ihollaback.org.
89. MARTY LANGELAN, Put a Stop to Sexual Harassment, in 50 WAYS TO IMPROVE
WOMEN’S LIVES: THE ESSENTIAL WOMEN’S GUIDE FOR ACHIEVING EQUALITY, HEALTH, AND
SUCCESS 120 (National Council of Women’s Organizations ed., 2005).
90. Id.; see also GARDNER, supra note 6, at 213–16; Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 195.
91. Talia Hagerty et al., Know Your Rights: Street Harassment and the Law, STOP
STREET HARASSMENT 11 (Dec. 2013), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content
/uploads/2013/12/SSH-KnowYourRights-StreetHarassmentandtheLaw-20131.pdf [http://
perma.cc/P99D-VNNR].
92. The use of active bystander strategies is not limited to women; any person, male or
female, may use these strategies to confront a person who is engaging in street harass-
ment, regardless of whether the target is known to the bystander.
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help, and (3) what, if anything, she would like for the bystander to
do, as well as confronting the harasser and telling him that his ac-
tions are unacceptable.93 Male bystanders may be particularly helpful
in such intervention techniques because male street harassers may
“look to other men for approval” of their behavior.94
Traditional and social media have helped activists raise aware-
ness of street harassment. For example, photojournalists have cata-
logued women’s accounts of what strange men have yelled to them
on the street,95 while other women have walked around with hidden
cameras and microphones to capture their own experiences with street
harassment on film.96 While neither street harassment nor media
attention of public harassment of women is a new phenomenon,97
93. Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 11; see also KEARL, supra note 12, at 140.
94. Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 11; see also KEARL, supra note 12, at 140.
95. See, e.g., Hannah Price, City of Brotherly Love, http://www.hannahcprice.com/city
ofbrotherlylove.html [http://perma.cc/N8ZS-LCRU] (portraits of men who catcalled the
photographer on the streets of Philadelphia, taken shortly after the photographer was
harassed); Alanna Vagianos, These Are the Things Men Say to Women on the Street,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/08
/things-men-say-to-women-on-street-harassment_n_5659877.html [http://perma.cc /59KQ
-MSC7] (showing photographs of women holding signs with quotes from men who have
street harassed them).
96. See, e.g., Rob Bliss Creative, 10 Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1XGPvbWn0A (last visited Nov. 4,
2015) [http://perma.cc/UCA2-2TZ3]. Rob Bliss Creative released this video, featuring
Shoshana B. Roberts, which received over 23 million views. To record the men who ha-
rassed her as she walked in a variety of Manhattan neighborhoods, Roberts attached a
hidden video camera to the backpack of an assistant who walked in front of her. Id. Roberts
recorded over 100 instances of men she did not know making lewd, suggestive, or otherwise
unwelcome comments to her as she passed by. Id. One man even walked beside her for
over five minutes after she ignored a comment he made to her. Id. After this video went
viral, Roberts received numerous rape threats. Andrea Peterson, Woman in Viral Street
Harassment Video Now Facing Rape Threats Online, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/29/woman-in-viral-street-harass
ment-video-now-facing-rape-threats-online [http://perma.cc/L8KT-AFSH].
97. In the early 20th century, Seattle would sentence men who harassed women in the
street to work in chain gangs. Knute Berger, The Surprising Way Seattle Used to Deal
with Street Harassment, CROSSCUT (Oct. 9, 2014), http://crosscut.com/2014/10/09/history
/122052/chain-gang-4-hobo-culture-street-harassment [http://perma.cc/66PY-JN9V].
Many articles about street harassment were published in popular print media in the 1970s
and 1980s. Bowman, supra note 1, at 528. This coincided with an increase in the number
of women entering the workforce, a rising first-marriage age, a rising divorce rate, an
increase in the number of women delaying childbirth, an increase in women participat-
ing in outdoor fitness, an increase in public acceptance of women traveling alone, and
a rising unemployment rate (which meant that more men were able to be out in public and
on the street where they could harass women, instead of being at work). Id. In the mid-
1980s and early 1990s, the media reported on organizers’ efforts to highlight street ha-
rassment in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Emily Bernard, Black Women and the Backwash
of Harassment, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1990, at C8; Carol Dana, Talking Back to Street
Harassers, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1986, at C5; Cristina Del Sesto, Our Mean Streets:
D.C.’s Women Walk Through Verbal Combat Zones, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1990, at B1;
I. Rajeswary, Anti-Rape Week Will Target Verbal Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1985, at
C2. Some scholars suggested that at this time there was no consensus on what behaviors
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the subject seems to be receiving a lot of attention in contemporary
media. For example, in 2014, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart aired
several segments featuring comedian Jessica Williams’s commen-
tary on how women are impacted by fear of violence generally,98 and
street harassment in particular.99
Commentary from pundits, bloggers, editorialists, and other
writers have highlighted a social debate about the effects of street
harassment. In 2008, CNN published an article in which the author
considered women’s conflicting views on street harassment as either
“creepy or a compliment[ ].”100 In August 2014, a panel of Fox News
commentators discussed whether men calling to women on the street
is acceptable behavior, generally agreeing that it is acceptable be-
cause men intend it as a compliment and that women can do nothing
to stop this behavior.101 Other outlets have similarly suggested that
women should not be bothered by street harassment, or should accept
it as a compliment.102 However, many authors have written about
actually constituted street harassment, or whether it should even be called street harass-
ment or something else. See, e.g., Kissling, supra note 50, at 457. Even into the 2000s,
media coverage of street harassment rarely examined “the complex motivations of . . .
harassers.” Laniya, supra note 12, at 120.
98. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, The Fault in Our Schools, COMEDY CENT.
(June 25, 2014), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/z2b627/the-fault-in-our-schools [http://
perma.cc/RX23-VQ5K] (satirical piece discussing men’s and women’s differing perspec-
tives on sexual assault victimization); see also Eliana Dockterman, Watch The Daily Show
Get Hilariously Real About Campus Sexual Assault, TIME (June 27, 2014), http://time
.com/2930987/daily-show-campus-sexual-assault [http://perma.cc/WS4M-AF8U]; Alanna
Vagianos, The Daily Show’s Jessica Williams Shuts Down News Commentator Who Thinks
Catcalling Is Great, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/09/03/jessica-williams-catcalling-daily-show_n_5759772.html [http://perma
.cc/QK9T-XHDY].
99. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Masters of Sexism—Claps and Catcalls, COM-
EDY CENT. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/v7vq7r/masters-of-sexism
---claps-and-catcalls [http://perma.cc/BQ4J-XJ6E] (pointing out that women walking on
public sidewalks are “not performing for men”); The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,
Jessica’s Feminized Atmosphere, COMEDY CENT. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://thedailyshow.cc
.com/news-team/jessica-williams/5ndnit/jessica-s-feminized-atmosphere [http://perma
.cc/98QD-MFZG] (interviewing women about their experiences with street harassment
in New York City); see also Sarene Leeds, Jessica Williams Continues Her War Against
Catcalls on ‘The Daily Show,’ WALL ST. J.: SPEAKEASY BLOG (Oct. 3, 2014, 7:30 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2014/10/03/jessica-williams-continues-her-war-against
-catcalls-on-the-daily-show [http://perma.cc/P52Z-VC2N].
100. Anna Jane Grossman, Catcalling: Creepy or a Compliment? CNN.COM (May 14,
2008, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/05/14/lw.catcalls/index.html
[http://perma.cc/XKJ6-D6ZV].
101. See Catherine Taibi, These Female Fox News Hosts Think Catcalling Is Perfectly
Fine, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
/08/29/catcalling-fox-news-outnumbered-sexist_n_5731174.html [http://perma.cc/L2JF
-AW2R] (includes video of relevant Fox News segment).
102. See, e.g., Doree Lewak, Hey, Ladies—Catcalls Are Flattering! Deal with It, N.Y.
POST (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:38 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/08/18/enough-sanctimony-ladies
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women’s negative personal experiences with street harassment, add-
ing anecdotal evidence to their calls for reform.103 One recent article
in a college newspaper placed an anti-street harassment mobile
application in the same category as apps designed to prevent and
address other forms of sexual violence, including intimate partner
violence and stranger rape, indicating a recognition of street harass-
ment as a form of sexual violence.104 This variety of recent media com-
mentary has coincided with a rise in a national discussion, and debate,
of other women’s issues, including the birth control mandate,105 states’
attempts to limit abortion access,106 and the pay gap between men
and women.107
-catcalls-are-flattering [http://perma.cc/EH25-MGD9] (suggesting that street remarks
incite feelings of euphoria and higher self-esteem).
103. See, e.g., Charing Ball, The Very Real Dangers of Street Harassment, MADAME
NOIRE (Oct. 10, 2014), http://madamenoire.com/476864/the-very-real-dangers-of-street
-harassment [http://perma.cc/T8N7-4BQS]; Laura Bates, Women Should Not Accept Street
Harassment as ‘Just a Compliment,’ THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www
.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2014/feb/28/women-street-harassment-power
-control-violence [http://perma.cc/GDC2-RF3F]; Caitriona Pagni, Walk This Way: Female
Students Subjected to Sexual Harassment by Construction Workers, GEORGETOWN VOICE
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://georgetownvoice.com/2014/10/02/walk-this-wayfemale-students-sub
jected-to-sexual-harassment-by-construction-workers [http://perma.cc/8HWG-UPWR];
Caroline Posner, POSNER: A New Frontier for Sexual Respect, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 4,
2014), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/09/04/posner-a-new-frontier-for-sexual-respect
[http://perma.cc/7DG9-YVPL]; Dana Reszutek, Catcalling Epidemic Must Be Recognized,
WASH. SQUARE NEWS (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.nyunews.com/2014/10/08/reszutek [http://
perma.cc/YV2Z-SK6J].
104. Katie Grimesey & Timothy Petraco, A Look at the Six Student Council–Endorsed
Safety Mobile Apps, THE CAVALIER DAILY (Oct. 5, 2014, 11:36 PM), http://www.cavalier
daily.com/article/2014/10/a-look-at-the-six-student-council-endorsed-safety-focuses-mobile
-apps [http://perma.cc/788Y-BVF4].
105. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2755 (2014); Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Rejects Contraceptives Mandate for Some Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/hobby-lobby-case-supreme-court-contraception
.html [http://perma.cc/7N88-E2KE]. Compare Robert Jeffress, Hobby Lobby Ruling: Why
Supreme Court Got It Right, FOXNEWS.COM (June 30, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com
/opinion/2014/06/30/hobby-lobby-ruling-why-supreme-court-got-it-right.html [http://perma
.cc/RF8G-8U9C] with Lisa Bloom, Why the Hobby Lobby Decision Is a Stunning Setback
for Women’s Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/lisa-bloom/why-the-hobby-lobby-decis_b_5565115.html [http://perma.cc/7PSC
-X8XN].
106. For example, Texas has recently experienced intense debate about the extent to
which the government may restrict abortion access. Recent state legislation has forced
many Texas facilities to stop offering abortion services. See Jon Herskovitz, Abortion
Rights Groups Ask Supreme Court to Halt Texas Restrictions, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2014,
8:20 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-abortion-rights-groups-ask-supreme-court
-to-halt-texas-restrictions-2014-10 [http://perma.cc/A2D5-7XZ8].
107. Some media outlets have recently paid attention to pay disparities between men
and women. See, e.g., Anna Bernasek, Two Numbers: The Gender Pay Gap, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 30, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/10/two-numbers-gender
-pay-gap-274363.html [http://perma.cc/5TU4-4PUB]; Jessica Meyers, Wage Gap for Women
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There are, however, several problems with addressing street
harassment solely by non-legal means. First, relying on individual
women—targets—to solve the problem of street harassment by con-
fronting each individual harasser ignores the fact that women are a
diverse group who may respond to street harassment differently based
on personality, sexual orientation, race, socioeconomic status, prior
experiences, the location, the content of the harassing remark(s), or
the identity of the harasser.108 Second, an individual-level confronta-
tional approach to reducing street harassment reflects a “perpetrator
perspective” instead of a “violence against women” perspective.109 A
“perpetrator perspective” considers each instance of street harass-
ment an isolated annoyance instead of a systemic form of maltreat-
ment of and violence against women.110
Third, ignoring the harasser may lead targets to feel powerless,
even if ignoring allows a target not to admit that she feels power-
less.111 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, confronting a street
harasser can escalate the situation and increase the likelihood of
physical harm perpetrated against the target.112 Gender is one of the
most important factors in likelihood of aggression.113 Since street
harassers are strangers, women have limited information from which
to determine whether the particular harasser poses a threat to their
physical safety.114 Thompson argues that high rates of violence against
women make it logical for a woman to assume that all men who give
her unwanted sexual attention on the street might become violent.115
Indeed, there have recently been several reported cases of physical
attacks on women who rebuffed street harassment.116
Persists, Despite Some Progress, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe
.com/news/nation/2014/09/27/massachusetts-sits-core-national-debate-over-gender-pay
-gap/SmEvXBIH5aaZiPiFby4oVL/story.html [http://perma.cc/5RMF-2Q3H].
108. Heben, supra note 4, at 189; Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 168 n.1.
109. Heben, supra note 4, at 203–04.
110. Id.; Laniya, supra note 12, at 119.
111. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 537; Thompson, supra note 7, at 313.
112. See Chhun, supra note 4, at 291 (noting that using counteraggression to defend
against catcalls may escalate the harasser’s aggression).
113. See Harris & Miller, supra note 52, at 843.
114. See KEARL, supra note 12, at 151.
115. Thompson, supra note 7, at 320–21.
116. In Queens, New York, a stranger slashed a woman’s throat after she refused to
go on a date with him. Tara Culp-Ressler, This Week, Two Incidents of Street Harassment
Escalated into Violent Attacks Against Women, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:52 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/10/09/3578215/street-harassment-escalates [http://
perma.cc/N5EA-AWFH]. In Detroit, a woman was shot and killed in a mass shooting that
injured five others, allegedly committed by a man unknown to the victim who relentlessly
harassed her, asking for her name and number before escalating the situation to grabbing
her, hitting her, and eventually shooting her when her fiancé tried to intervene. Kate
Abbey-Lambertz, Woman Shot, Killed After Saying No to a Man’s Advances, Detroit Police
Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
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The problems with non-legal methods of addressing street harass-
ment may be exacerbated by an apparent paradox in how the legal
system responds to women who confront their harassers. Often,
“[j]udges and juries as well as the general public continue to believe
that assertive responses, such as confronting or reporting the ha-
rasser, are most appropriate . . . .”117 But courts have also been known
to chastise women for fighting back when confronted by strangers on
the street,118 perhaps reflecting a sense that women should be passive
and just walk away from a street harasser.119 The following sections
of this Note will examine legal attempts to address street harassment.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ADDRESSING STREET HARASSMENT
Historically, few lawsuits dealt with the issue of stranger ha-
rassment of women in public places. In a case unusual for its time,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an award of damages against
a train conductor who sexually harassed a female train passenger and
kissed her without her consent.120 This case echoed court rulings in
nineteenth century criminal cases imposing fines and short jail sen-
tences on men who frightened women in public or otherwise subjected
them to vulgar, unwanted attention.121 Women continued to struggle
/10/07/mary-spears-killed-detroit_n_5945518.html [http://perma.cc/J9TD-MJ8A]; Mass
Shooting Kills Mother of Three, Wounds Five Others, FOX 46 CHARLOTTE (Oct. 8, 2014,
11:22 PM), http://www.fox46charlotte.com/story/26719319/mass-shooting-kills-mother
-of-three-wounds-five-others [http://perma.cc/G25J-GG7B]. In San Francisco, a man who
street harassed a woman by asking her to perform oral sex on him slashed her face and
stabbed her arm with a knife when she ignored his request. Mike Aldax, Brute Slashes
Woman for Refusing Sexual Advances in Tenderloin, THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisc/brute-slashes-woman-for-refusing
-sexual-advances-in-tenderloin/Content?oid=2319617 [http://perma.cc/3LJZ-E775]; Katie
J.M. Baker, SF Street Harassment Stabbing Is a Great Reminder that Catcalling Isn’t
a Joke, JEZEBEL (Jan. 8, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://jezebel.com/5974261/sf-street-harassment
-stabbing-is-a-great-reminder-that-catcalling-isnt-a-joke [http://perma.cc/5P5C-ZJ7Z];
FUBU-Clad Man Hits on Woman, Then Stabs Her, THE SAN FRANCISCO APPEAL (Jan. 8,
2013, 10:19 AM), http://sfappeal.com/2013/01/fubu-clad-man-hits-on-woman-then-stabs
-her [http://perma.cc/Y7MJ-JP98]. These stories are not the only reported instances of
physical violence used against women who rebuffed street harassment.
117. Magley, supra note 84, at 943 (internal citations omitted).
118. See Ramakrishnan, supra note 4, at 327–28. For example, a New York judge
criticized three women convicted of gang assault after a jury rejected their self-defense
claim that they were fending off an attack motivated by sexual orientation bias;
Anemona Hartocollis, Four Women Are Convicted in Attack on Man in Village, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/nyregion/19attack.html [http://perma
.cc/DW7V-93T4].
119. See Ramakrishnan, supra note 4, at 327–28; see also Hartocollis, supra note 118.
120. Craker v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 659, 679 (1875).
121. See KERRY SEGRAVE, BEWARE THE MASHER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC PLACES, 1880–1930, 118–19 (2014).
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to win civil judgments against public harassers through the mid-
twentieth century; for example, in 1951, a Pennsylvania court refused
to grant an invasion of privacy cause of action to a plaintiff to whom
the defendant addressed “obnoxious words” in public.122 The court
found that the woman could press criminal charges of disorderly
conduct or pursue a civil remedy under a slander theory.123
In sum, few early civil suits focused on stranger-perpetrated
public harassment of women. Over time, the majority of sexual ha-
rassment plaintiffs have instead worked to address workplace sexual
harassment.124 Modern courts have, in a victory for women’s rights,
advanced the notion that women should be free from unwanted sex-
ual attention in the workplace.125 However, these court decisions have
had little impact on women’s legal rights and protections with respect
to street harassment.
At least one court has recognized that just because sexually
harassing behavior is “commonplace” does not mean it is acceptable,
and that the broader social context in which such behavior occurs is
relevant in judging the “objective severity” of the sexual harassment.126
That said, street harassment, by definition, occurs in a particular
context—in public places, not the woman’s workplace.127 While the
law may draw from the policy considerations of gender equality, anti-
discrimination principles, and elimination of the public/private sphere
dichotomy that have shaped workplace harassment law, street ha-
rassment is a discrete problem that requires its own distinct legal
treatment.128 Modern legal approaches to addressing street harass-
ment have included both civil and criminal liability schemes and have
faced strong criticism on First Amendment grounds.
A. First Amendment Considerations
Any attempt, civil or criminal, to provide legal relief for victims
of street harassment may face First Amendment challenges.129 Some
122. Christie v. Greenleaf, 78 Pa. D. & C. 191, 191 (1951).
123. Id. at 192. The court found that the line demarcating invasion of privacy had to
do with whether the offender made declarations about the plaintiff to the general public,
rather than to her while in a public sphere, with only the former being actionable under
an invasion of privacy theory. Id.
124. See, e.g., Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, 729 N.E.2d 726, 736 (Ohio 2000).
125. Id. at 737.
126. Id. at 736.
127. di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 51–52.
128. See Deborah M. Chalfie, Your Legal Options: Sexual Harassment and the Law,
in BACK OFF!: HOW TO CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 357
(Martha J. Langelan ed., 1993) (“Paradoxically, although the street is where sexual harass-
ment occurs most often and can be most threatening, it is also the place where women have
the fewest legal remedies.”).
129. See NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 20.
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scholars have suggested that anti-street harassment statutes would
survive First Amendment review.130 Despite opposition, grounded
in free speech concerns, to such statutes,131 these statutes might
fall within established First Amendment exceptions for low-value
speech,132 fighting words,133 and secondary effects.134
The Supreme Court has held that “[s]exual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”135
The Government may nonetheless impose restrictions on constitu-
tionally protected speech if those restrictions satisfy strict scrutiny.136
Under this standard, the Government must show that any content-
based restriction on speech, such as a hypothetical restriction on street
harassment, is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
state interest.137
The protection of women’s liberty, equality, and security in public
space is a compelling state interest.138 Greenawalt proposes four justi-
fications “for suppressing abusive language”: (1) lessening the danger
of violence, (2) preventing the psychological injury that is inflicted on
the target of such language, (3) addressing the general social offense
or outrage that such language is used, and (4) the “destructive long
term effects from the attitudes reinforced by abusive remarks.”139 As
previously noted, street harassment reinforces the destructive atti-
tude of male superiority and social acceptance of violence against
women.140 Proponents of an anti-street harassment restriction on
speech would, however, need to demonstrate that such a restriction
is the most narrowly tailored way of remedying the problem.141
130. Id. at 28 (explaining that, according to one view, “offensive speech may fall into an
unprotected category” as offensive speech “undermines productive political debate”).
131. See id. (citing the argument that “almost all restrictions on speech” should be pro-
hibited in order to “protect democratic deliberation”).
132. E.g., commercial speech. See id. at 20.
133. Id. at 23.
134. See id. at 27 (“Courts seem to be responsive to efforts to restrict speech (1) where
there is empirical evidence . . . about harm . . . .”).
135. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Bowman, supra note 1, at 546; Chhun, supra note 4, at 288. The state has an in-
terest in protecting and promoting gender equality through ensuring that women may
move through public space (e.g., use public transportation and shop in public stores) with
the same degree of personal security as men. In 2013, the United States ranked 5th on
the United Nations’ Human Development Index but ranked 47th on the UN’s Gender
Inequality Index, indicating that there is greater gender inequality in the United States
than in other similarly developed countries. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
Table 4: Gender Inequality Index, HUMAN DEV. REPORTS, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content
/table-4-gender-inequality-index [http://perma.cc/5UYW-8UPP].
139. Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
L. REV. 287, 294 (1990).
140. di Leonardo, supra note 12, at 53.
141. See Greenawalt, supra note 139, at 298.
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In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that speech
may be regulated because of the harm it produces only when it can be
shown that the speech is “directed to” produce imminent, “extremely
likely” harm.142 However, in Hess v. Indiana,143 the Court “rejected
the notion that this showing can be made by linking a class of harm
with a class of speech . . . .”144 It is insufficient to claim that street
harassment may be regulated under Brandenburg for two reasons:
one, research shows that, although street harassment produces harm
for its targets, harassers rarely direct their remarks with the pur-
pose of causing harm,145 and two, not all targets experience the same
harms from being street harassed.146 Accordingly, the “least restric-
tive means” or “narrow tailoring” prong might be difficult to satisfy.
For these reasons, advocates might have more success arguing
that street harassment falls within an established exception to First
Amendment protection. This argument may take a number of forms.
In the first place, “threats, verbal violence, and vulgarity” are not
given absolute First Amendment protection: federal courts have con-
sistently enforced regulations against these types of speech, which
are often included in street harassment.147 Second, while one purpose
of the First Amendment is to protect speech on matters of public
concern, street harassers’ remarks on women’s appearances do not
generally constitute “matter[s] of public concern.”148 Third, and per-
haps most instructive, some jurisdictions have rejected defendants’
free speech claims in response to workplace sexual harassment claims
under Title VII.149
142. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment,
1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 602 (1986).
143. 414 U.S. 105, 105 (1973).
144. Sunstein, supra note 142, at 602.
145. Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 71.
146. The social gender- and power-based harms that affect women as a group occur
consistently when women are street harassed, but individual women may experience
different psychological or emotional harms when they are victimized. See Fredrickson
& Roberts, supra note 70, at 174.
147. Thompson, supra note 7, at 338, 338 n.156–58 (internal footnotes omitted).
148. The Fourth Circuit has held that “ ‘[s]peech involves a matter of public concern
when it involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to a community.’ ” Snyder
v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 220 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, N.C.,
388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004)). Arguably, a man’s sexualized remarks on a woman’s
physical features would not fall within this definition; by contrast, the public concern might
actually be the perpetration of street harassment, not the remarks themselves.
149. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (holding that sexually oriented verbal harassment is not protected speech);
Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 961 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (upholding Title VII violation
arising from false rumors of a sexual relationship between female professor and male
department chair); Thompson, supra note 7, at 337 n.152; see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent
A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 853 (Cal. 1999) (holding that the right to free speech is
not absolute and enjoining defendants from using racial epithets in the workplace). Note,
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Street harassment may also be regulated as “low-value” speech.
Through its First Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court has de-
termined that some kinds of speech are of lower value than others.150
Though the Court has never articulated an exact definition of “low-
value” speech, its decisions concerning which speech restrictions to
uphold and which to reject indicate that the Court engages in “harm-
based analysis of this sort of speech which allows its regulation only
upon a demonstration that the speech in question is in fact likely to
produce unlawful action.”151 Sunstein suggests four factors for deter-
mining when speech is “low-value.”152 These include whether the
speech is relevant to public affairs, whether the speech is cognitive or
non-cognitive, whether the speaker’s purpose is to send some kind
of message or impart some knowledge, and whether the Government
has a legitimate reason to regulate the speech.153
Street harassment almost certainly qualifies as low-value speech.
Catcalls force unavoidable communication between harasser and
target that has the strong potential to instill shock in the target and
harm her physically and emotionally.154 The communication is purely
upsetting and insulting, so it is not a socially or politically valuable
form of dialogue.155 Street harassment is also in no way political
speech.156 Finally, through their remarks, street harassers have no
intention of imparting knowledge upon or beginning a cognitive
dialogue with targets.157 The value of the speech contained within
street harassment is therefore low and may theoretically be subject
to regulation.
Street harassment may also fall within the fighting words ex-
ception to the First Amendment. “Fighting words” statutes, which
“prohibit the use of abusive language that tends to incite a breach
of the peace,”158 have typically been upheld against First Amendment
challenges.159 These statutes focus less on the speaker’s intent and
more on the receiver’s probable reaction to the words.160 The Supreme
Court defines “fighting words” as “what men of common intelligence
however, that the Aguilar court found that no actionable harassment has occurred where
there is only isolated, sporadic, or trivial instances of offensive conduct. Id. at 851.
150. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 298
(1995).
151. Id. at 299.
152. Sunstein, supra note 142, at 603.
153. Id. at 603–04.
154. Chhun, supra note 4, at 289.
155. Id.
156. Bowman, supra note 1, at 545–46.
157. Id. at 546.
158. Id. at 558–59.
159. Id. at 559.
160. Id.; Chhun, supra note 4, at 292.
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would understand would be words likely to cause an average ad-
dressee to fight . . . .”161 Where the chance of responsive violence is
high, courts have generally upheld restrictions on speech under the
fighting words doctrine.162
The fighting words doctrine arose to prevent men from dueling in
response to spoken insults.163 It is justified on grounds of the need to
prohibit general offensiveness: while the Supreme Court has held that
the offensiveness of language alone cannot justify its prohibition,164
the Court has upheld restrictions on offensive speech in particular
contexts, like school assemblies,165 and radio stations.166
The argument could be made that in these situations the listener
could simply leave the assembly or switch the radio station to avoid
offensive remarks. However, women walking in public cannot simply
leave the situation to escape the harassment, because street harass-
ment by definition involves unplanned, unwanted interactions with
strangers—not voluntary tuning into a radio station or attendance
at an assembly.167 So if the Court is willing to uphold prohibitions on
offensive speech in those situations, it should also be willing to up-
hold a prohibition on offensive, vulgar, derogatory speech aimed by
strangers at women in public spaces.
There are, however, some serious problems with applying the
fighting words doctrine to street harassment. First, women have not
usually been socialized to respond to insult by fighting.168 Second, the
reasonable man standard reflects a White male bias and is inappro-
priate to address street harassment because White men are rarely
the targets of street harassment.169 Third, the doctrine focuses on
161. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942).
162. See Greenawalt, supra note 139, at 295.
163. See Chhun, supra note 4, at 289. This history does not properly conceptualize mod-
ern gendered responses to unwanted and harmful verbal communications on the street
because it conceives only of a world in which men physically fight each other in response
to insults and in which no one reacts differently than that. Id. at 290–91.
164. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1971) (overturning the conviction of
a man who wore a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” into a courthouse on the
grounds that his message was a form of political commentary and that he did not intend
for the words to personally insult any viewer).
165. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
166. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978); see also
Greenawalt, supra note 139, at 301.
167. See Greenawalt, supra note 139, at 301.
168. Bowman notes that the fighting words doctrine “presupposes an encounter between
two persons of relatively equal power who have been socialized to respond to insults with
violence.” Bowman, supra note 1, at 560–61. Street harassment perpetuates and implies
an unequal power dynamic where the harasser is more powerful than the target. Even
though women may not have been socialized to react to insult with violence, they are still
harmed by catcalls and it does not make them “less injured” when they do not respond
by fighting. Chhun, supra note 4, at 290–91.
169. Bowman, supra note 1, at 560–61; Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 12. A rea-
sonable man’s reaction to street harassment may be very different from a reasonable
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verbal interactions, ignoring nonverbal forms of harassment, and
focuses on the disruption of public peace rather than the real injury
of street harassment—a violation of the female target’s privacy and
liberty and the subordination of women.170 Finally, at least one court
has refused to categorically apply fighting words statutes to stranger
sexual harassment.171 Despite these problems, the fighting words doc-
trine may provide the most effective shield against claims that street
harassment regulations violate the First Amendment because few
would argue that the First Amendment should in all cases protect
words that constitute or might incite violence.
A final First Amendment doctrine that may apply to street ha-
rassment is the secondary effects doctrine. The Government gener-
ally may not engage in content-based regulation of speech;172 such
regulations are, as previously noted, subject to strict scrutiny.173
However, if the secondary effects of speech are harmful enough, the
government may impose content-based regulations on that speech
if the regulation is based on those secondary effects and not on re-
stricting the content itself.174 One could argue that street harass-
ment regulations may survive First Amendment scrutiny under this
doctrine if the point of such statutes is not to regulate what men say
so much as it is to regulate the various harms that women experi-
ence as a result of those words.
B. Tort Remedies
The rationale behind a tort cause of action for street harassment
is that “[i]ncreasing the cost of a behavior, by making it possible to
challenge the behavior legally, is thought to decrease its frequency.”175
woman’s reaction.
170. Bowman, supra note 1, at 562.
171. See Lamar v. Banks, 684 F.2d 714, 715 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming that a state’s
fighting words statute was not invalid on its face but reversing and remanding its ap-
plication against a defendant taxicab driver who made unwelcome sexual advances, both
verbal and physical, upon a female passenger, for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s
argument that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case; the court noted
that on remand the issue would be whether the defendant’s words would tend to provoke
his passenger to violence).
172. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down an ordi-
nance prohibiting display of a symbol which one knows or has reason to know might incite
anger, resentment, or other negative feelings in others on the basis of race, religion, or gen-
der on the ground that the statute prohibited speech on the basis of the ideas it expressed).
173. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed, Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989).
174. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 7, at 338 (“A content based regulation does not
violate the First Amendment if it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech . . . [and is] aimed not at the content of the [speech], but rather at [its]
secondary effects.’ ” (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986)).
175. Heben, supra note 4, at 206.
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Tort remedies empower victims to rid themselves of the sense of pow-
erlessness, victimization, and helplessness that street harassment
creates.176 Tort remedies also allow only those women who feel harmed
by street harassment to recover; women who view street remarks as
compliments are not required to file suit.177 The tort action allows
a street harassment target to judge her own need for legal recourse
and recognition of the harm done to her by the harasser.178 Three
tort causes of action may theoretically be invoked by a target seek-
ing to sue her harasser. These are invasion of privacy,179 intentional
infliction of emotional distress,180 and assault.181
The tort of invasion of privacy is premised on the notion that
“disrespect and mistreatment of individuals causes harm and makes
them feel as though they are less than full citizens.”182 The cause of
action should, then, provide relief to victims of street harassment
who have been subordinated, disrespected, and therefore harmed by
unwanted male intrusions on their existence in public spaces. The
intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action should
also theoretically provide street harassment victims with redress for
the psychological harms they suffer.183 Finally, the tort of assault, in
theory, provides the most effective civil remedy for victims of street
harassment, regardless of whether their harassers physically touch
them. Since the tort requires harmful or offensive contact or an im-
minent apprehension of that contact, its elements seem to mirror the
ways in which many street harassers interact with their targets.184
These tort remedies, however, are fraught with practical limita-
tions on their effectiveness at addressing street harassment. First, a
street harassment victim will likely find it difficult to name a defen-
dant in a civil lawsuit because street harassment is almost always
perpetrated by a stranger to the victim.185 Second, many potential
176. Id. at 206–07.
177. Id. at 208.
178. Id.
179. Defined in relevant part as “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(a) (1997).
180. “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
181. The tort of assault requires two elements: (1) an actor acts “intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact,” and (2) the other person experiences “such imminent
apprehension.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965).
182. Heben, supra note 4, at 209.
183. Bowman, supra note 1, at 564.
184. Bowman, supra note 1, at 549–50.
185. Heben, supra note 4, at 212.
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plaintiffs would be unable to afford an attorney and would not have
the time or resources to investigate the harasser’s identity.186 Third,
emotional injuries like those caused by street harassment are invisi-
ble and may therefore be taken less seriously by judges and juries.187
Doctrinally, the tort actions of invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and assault are problematic when
applied to street harassment.188 This is due to the intent requirement
and “reasonable person” standard that applies to these tort causes
of action.189 A harasser’s behavior may not satisfy the intent require-
ment because, as previously noted, many harassers view their be-
havior as complimentary or trivial.190 Few street harassers intend
to harm the women to whom they direct their attention.191 It would
therefore be difficult for a plaintiff suing her street harasser to dem-
onstrate the requisite intent for torts like assault and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, much as the fighting
words doctrine is problematic with respect to street harassment, the
“reasonable person” standard applicable to tort causes of action, es-
pecially assault and invasion of privacy, fails to account for the highly
gender-specific experience of street harassment victimization.192
Finally, the over-representation of men in legislative bodies
makes it unlikely that a new tort remedy that specifically addresses
street harassment will emerge; if men are not victimized by street
harassment or do not view it as harmful, they are less likely to pro-
vide a cause of action to redress the harm it causes.193 Because of
these limitations of tort actions, it is necessary to explore the use of
the criminal law as a remedy to the problem of street harassment.
C. Eliminating Street Harassment Through the Criminal Law
1. What States Are Currently Doing
State law typically prohibits harassment, assault, and other
forms of forced, unwanted interactions.194 In theory, criminal laws
186. Id.
187. Id. at 207.
188. Id. at 208–11; Laniya, supra note 12, at 126; see also Duncan Kennedy, Sexual
Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309,
1318 (1992).
189. See Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 12; Heben, supra note 4, at 211.
190. Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 71; McAllister, supra note 18, at 37.
191. See Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 71.
192. See Heben, supra note 4, at 209; see also Bowman, supra note 1, at 560–61;
Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 12.
193. Heben, supra note 4, at 207.
194. To explore the basic forms that such laws take, I will rely on the statutory provi-
sions of six American states: New York, California, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and
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proscribing such conduct would apply to street harassment. In many
ways, however, the criminal law fails to address the unique charac-
teristics of street harassment and thus fails to provide a remedy for
victims.195
State criminal laws prohibiting unwanted or otherwise offen-
sive interpersonal interactions can generally be categorized as fol-
lows: verbal harassment, following, groping, unwanted filming and
photography, indecent exposure, and hate crimes.196 Verbal harass-
ment charges may include disorderly conduct,197 harassment,198
intimidation,199 obstruction of movement,200 loitering,201 and pros-
titution (including solicitation).202 “Following” may encompass a
variety of proscribed behaviors, including stalking and assault.203
Georgia. These states are geographically diverse but are each home to at least one major
city. In 2013, Stop Street Harassment—a non-profit organization that attempts to docu-
ment and eliminate street harassment—released a report that compiled the criminal
laws of all 50 states that could possibly pertain to street harassment. This report and its
categorization by offense type provided the basis for this analysis. See Hagerty et al.,
supra note 91.
195. Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 287.
196. See id. at 1–2, 7.
197. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 71 (S.B. 1304) (West), 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 710 (A.B. 1791) (West), 2014 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 714 (S.B. 1388) (West), and 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 863 (S.B. 1255)
(West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39 (1995); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (2013), amended by
Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-180 (H.B. 2755) (West); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1965);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5503 (West 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (West 2013).
198. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 640 (West 2013) (harassment on public transpor-
tation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 1994) (harassment in the second degree);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709 (West 2014) (harassment).
199. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-6 (2011) (intimidation).
200. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647c (West 1968) (obstruction of street, sidewalk, or
other place open to public); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.03 (West 1994) (obstructing
highway or other passageway).
201. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653b (West 2010) (loitering at or near a public school);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 407–409 (West 1969) (unlawful assembly, defined in part in § 407
as whenever two or more people gather together to do some “lawful act in a violent, bois-
terous, or tumultuous manner”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36 (1980) (loitering or prowling);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 2010) (loitering); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5506
(West 1973) (loitering and prowling at nighttime). Texas does not include loitering in its
penal code. See Jones v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. App. 100, 100 (1962).
202. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i(a)(1) (West 2011) (pandering; notably, this statute
does not cover solicitation of a prostitute); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-9 (2001) (prostitution);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.1 (2015) (solicitation of a sexual act); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00
(McKinney 1969) (prostitution); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (McKinney 1976) (loitering for
the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902(b)(4)
(West 2012) (prostitution, soliciting a prostitute); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02 (West
2013) (prostitution).
203. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 2008) (stalking); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90
(2000) (stalking); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1 (2011) (assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-
7.3 (2013) (stalking); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1994) (harassment in the first
degree; prohibits following a person for the purpose of intentionally and repeatedly harass-
ing them); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.45 (McKinney 2014), 120.50 (McKinney 1999), 120.55
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Similarly, “groping” may include various forms of battery and crimi-
nal sexual contact.204
The provisions of these laws, however, often fail to account for
the interactions common within a street harassment encounter.205
For example, indecent exposure statutes may punish some street
harassers, but only those whose harassment includes inappropriate
exposure of their bodies.206 Similarly, laws prohibiting unwanted
filming and photography would apply only to street harassers who
engage in that specific behavior against their targets.207 Laws pro-
hibiting groping, battery, and other forms of unwanted physical and/
or sexual contact do not protect women whose harassers only call out
to them or engage in other non-contact behaviors (e.g. whistling, leer-
ing, or gesturing).208 Hate crime legislation typically requires that
the perpetrator act based on some type of prejudice;209 with respect
(McKinney 2008), 120.60 (McKinney 2000) (stalking); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(a)(2)
(West 2014) (harassment by means of following a person); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709.1
(West 2003) (stalking); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072 (West 2013) (stalking).
204. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e) (West 2003) (sexual battery); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-23 (2015) (simple battery); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-22.1 (2006) (sexual battery); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3 (2011) (battery); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.50 (2011) (criminal
sexual abuse); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.52 (McKinney 2003) (prohibiting forcible touching of
sexual or intimate parts of another person, including by squeezing, grabbing, or pinching);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (West 2006) (indecent assault, prohibiting certain non-
consensual contact); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2013) (assault). But see N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 2014) (aggravated harassment in the second degree, pro-
hibiting certain types of offensive contact with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm the
other person), held unconstitutional by People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813–14 (N.Y. 2014)
(holding that § 240.30 was unconstitutionally broad and vague).
205. See Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 287.
206. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8 (1996) (public
indecency); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-30 (2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 (McKinney
1968) (public lewdness); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1984) (exposure of a
person); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3127 (West 1995) (indecent exposure); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5901 (West 1973) (open lewdness); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (West
1994) (indecent exposure); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(10) (West 2013) (Texas’s
disorderly conduct statute covers some forms of indecent exposure, including exposure
of one’s anus or genitals in a public place).
207. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-4 (2012) (unauthorized video recording and
live video transmission); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2014) (unlawful sur-
veillance in the second degree); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1(a)(1) (West 2006)
(Pennsylvania’s invasion of privacy statute includes non-consensual filming without the
subject’s knowledge or consent “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual de-
sire of any person”). But see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.15 (West 2007), held uncon-
stitutional by Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding
that photographs and visual recordings are expressive and therefore protected by the
First Amendment).
208. See Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 287.
209. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 2005), limitation recognized by People
v. Lindberg, 190 P.3d 664, 665 (Cal. 2008) (holding that to convict a defendant of a hate
murder where multiple concurrent motives exist, the defendant’s prohibited bias must
have been a substantial factor in the crime); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2013) (requiring
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to street harassment, a victim might have to prove that the harasser
targeted her because of his bias against women.210 Finally, as with
tort remedies that require a showing of intent on the part of the
tortfeasor, any criminal statute that requires proof of the harasser’s
intent to harm, harass, or otherwise interfere with the target will
provide little assistance in combating street harassment.211 This is
in part because proving such intent can be difficult,212 and in part
because many harassers do not believe that their behavior is harm-
ful to their targets.213 Many of the existing criminal laws, at least in
the states with major cities, fail to adequately address the problem
of street harassment.214
One additional and perhaps overlooked area of the criminal law
that could apply to some street harassment interactions is Stand
Your Ground. Stand Your Ground laws generally authorize the use
of deadly physical force in self-defense where a person reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
serious bodily harm to himself.215 The critical feature of Stand Your
that the perpetrator’s motive be based on actual or perceived race, national origin, sexual
orientation, religion, color, creed, or disability); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1)(b) (McKinney
2010) (requiring that the offender intentionally target the victim on the basis of “race,
color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual
orientation”).
210. Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 7. This would be difficult to do, particularly if a
harasser could articulate some nonprejudicial reason for his behavior (e.g. trying to com-
pliment the target). See Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 70–71; McAllister, supra
note 18, at 37.
211. See Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 287.
212. See Benard & Schlaffer, supra note 8, at 70–71; McAllister, supra note 18, at 37.
213. See KEARL, supra note 12, at 37 (“Men who claim that they would love to have
women harass them . . . tend to ignore the context in which street harassment occurs.
Around the world, men are more powerful than women, and street harassment is one
more manifestation of that power.”).
214. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 199.
215. As of this writing, 22 states have Stand Your Ground laws. See ALA. CODE § 13A-
3-23 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.335 (West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-405
(2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (West 2001);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23.1 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(c) (West 2013); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5230 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (West 2006) (providing
for the justified use of deadly force “when the defendant believes that such force is nec-
essary to protect himself against . . . sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat” among
other threats to life and bodily safety); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.972 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(4) (West 2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-110 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.120 (West 2015);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.3 (West 2011); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D) (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (2.3) (West
2011) (specifying the threat of forced sexual intercourse as one threat to which one may
respond with deadly force without a duty to retreat); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(C) (2006);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(1) (West 2012);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(e) (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22 (West 2008).
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Ground is the elimination of the duty to retreat.216 This is a departure
from the common-law rule (still followed in many states) that a per-
son must retreat before using deadly force against another if he can
do so “with complete safety.” 217 Stand Your Ground laws also typi-
cally apply wherever a person is lawfully permitted to be and do not
limit the no “duty to retreat” provision to one’s home or vehicle.218
Stand Your Ground laws would theoretically apply only to the
most serious street harassment encounters, such as those where the
harasser uses or credibly threatens to use physical force against the
target. However, because male and female defendants invoking Stand
Your Ground outside of the street harassment context have faced
drastically disparate treatment in the legal system,219 and because
Stand Your Ground would only apply to the most extreme street ha-
rassment encounters, scholars express skepticism that Stand Your
Ground will ever be a generally effective remedy for street harass-
ment.220 Additionally, proponents of Stand Your Ground laws have
failed to encourage use of the laws by women who experience street
harassment, despite the fact that women are more likely to experience
threats and violence in this form than, for example, stranger rape.221
Stand Your Ground laws do not provide an adequate solution
to street harassment for several reasons.222 First, at least two states
with large urban populations have not adopted Stand Your Ground
laws.223 Second, to rely solely on Stand Your Ground laws—which
justify the use of physical force only when a person reasonably fears
the imminent use of force against herself—to address street harass-
ment is to ignore the vast majority of street harassment interactions,
where the harasser makes no explicit threat of violence against the
target.224 Third, the reasonable person standard of Stand Your
216. Ebonie R. Rocio, Flip a Coin: Heads, Stand Your Ground Is Good Law . . . Tails,
Stand Your Ground Is Bad Law, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014).
217. Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground,
Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence As Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099,
1104 (2014).
218. Rocio, supra note 216, at 5.
219. For example, George Zimmerman, infamous for shooting Trayvon Martin, an un-
armed Black teenager, in a Florida suburb, successfully invoked that state’s Stand Your
Ground law and was acquitted of all charges, while Marissa Alexander, a Florida woman
who fired a “warning shot” in the air to fend off her “abusive ex-husband,” was sentenced
to 20 years in prison despite not actually injuring him. See Franks, supra note 217, at 1103.
220. See Franks, supra note 217, at 1099 (arguing that Stand Your Ground laws
“actually reinforce and exacerbate existing gender divides in self-defense law that dis-
proportionately harm women”).
221. See id. at 1110.
222. See id. at 1108–09.
223. Neither California nor New York has enacted a Stand Your Ground law. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1963); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 2004).
224. See Chhun, supra note 4, at 276.
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Ground may present the same doctrinal problem as the reasonable
man standard of the fighting words doctrine,225 in that reasonable
men may not experience the fright from street harassment that rea-
sonable women would be likely to feel.226 Finally, the use of Stand
Your Ground to address street harassment fails to consider targets’
potential unease or discomfort in confronting their harassers; many
victims, for a variety of reasons, feel most comfortable paying no
direct attention to the harasser at all in the moments during and
just after the encounter.227
2. Model Locality Approaches
A few cities have recently begun to address street harassment
through means such as public forums, non-legal awareness cam-
paigns, surveys, and legislative proposals.228 For example, an Iowa
City college student frustrated by her own experience being street
harassed, and by others’ unsupportive responses to her frustration,
organized a public forum at a city library so that others could share
their similar experiences in a supportive environment.229 One goal
of the forum was to educate people about their legal rights against
street harassment.230
In New York City, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
has taken non-legal steps to address street harassment on subways
and buses.231 This move follows a 2007 report on street harassment
and sexual assault in the city’s subway system,232 which found that
victims rarely sought assistance from either the New York Police
Department or the MTA,233 the perceived threat of sexual victimiza-
tion was “pervasive” in the subway system, and actual sexual harass-
ment and assault were common.234 The report recommended that the
MTA consider establishing a hotline for victims to report instances
225. Discussed in Part III.A, supra.
226. Bowman, supra note 1, at 560–61, 62; Hagerty et al., supra note 91, at 12–13.
227. Bowman, supra note 1, at 537.
228. Scott M. Stringer, Hidden in Plain Sight: Sexual Harassment and Assault in the
New York City Subway System, N.Y. TIMES (July 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/packages
/pdf/nyregion/city_room/20070726_hiddeninplainsight.pdf [http://perma.cc/825H-8UUB];
Alison Sullivan, Ending Street Harassment: Iowa City Forum Aims to Stop Threats,
Catcalls, THE GAZETTE (Sept. 2, 2014, 6:54 PM) http://thegazette.com/subject/news
/ending-street-harassment-iowa-city-forum-aims-to-stop-threats-catcalls-20140902
[http://perma.cc/HLG7-KZ9S].
229. Sullivan, supra note 228. Forum organizers hope to implement bystander interven-
tion training to teach people how to stand up for others who are being street harassed. Id.
230. Id.
231. Stringer, supra note 228, at 22.
232. Id. at 8.
233. Id. at 14–15.
234. Id. at 17.
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of sexual harassment on the subway, adding more police presence
to the subway system, and installing better lighting, public phone
access, and cellular phone service in subway cars and stations.235 The
MTA recently announced its plans to install cameras in more than
900 subway cars236 and create an online reporting mechanism for
victims of subway sexual harassment.237
While the Iowa City and New York City responses demonstrate
that cities are beginning to take the problem of street harassment seri-
ously, the legislative response to street harassment in Kansas City,
Missouri represents one of the only attempts to modify the criminal
law to address the particular characteristics of street harassment.238
The Kansas City ordinance, passed unanimously by the City Council,
protects bicyclists, walkers, and other travelers on public sidewalks—
including those in wheelchairs and those waiting for public transit—
from street harassment.239 The ordinance is based on a Columbia,
Missouri ordinance, passed in 2009, that prohibits anyone from ha-
rassing a cyclist, walker, or wheelchair user verbally, by throwing ob-
jects, or by any other threatening behavior.240 Those convicted under
the ordinance face criminal sanctions, including fines and possible
jail time.241
3. Policy Proposal
The law theoretically provides a mechanism for victims of street
harassment to confront their harassers without having to risk their
235. Id. at 18–20.
236. Andrew Mei, MTA to Increase Surveillance in Subway Cars, WASH. SQ. NEWS
(Oct. 7, 2014), http://nyunews.com/2014/10/07/surveillance-2 [http://perma.cc/ZC4H-YCAV].
Before this announcement, no MTA subway cars were equipped with cameras. See Wendy
Joan Biddlecombe, Activists, Public Advocate, Announce New MTA Measures to Curb
Sexual Harassment on Mass Transit, METRO (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.metro.us/newyork
/news/local/2014/10/01/activists-public-advocate-announce-new-mta-measures-curb-sexual
-harassment-mass-transit [http://perma.cc/VH9E-4RL6].
237. Saila Huusko, New York City Launches Campaign to End Sexual Harassment on
the Subway, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 6, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com
/articles/2014/10/6/new-york-city-launchescampaigntoendsexualharassmentonthesubway
.html [http://perma.cc/6E4D-B55T].
238. Kansas City, MO, Ordinance No. 140777, § 50-205 (2014); see also Mike Hendricks,
KC Considers Law Against Street Harassment of Walkers, Cyclists, and Others, KANSAS
CITY STAR (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/news /government-politics/article
2107031.html [http://perma.cc/DYM3-Z9VE]; KCMO Council Passes Amended Pedestrian,
Bicycle Harassment Ordinance, KSHB KANSAS CITY (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.kshb.com
/news/local-news/kcmo-council-passes-amended-pedestrian-bicycle-harassment-ordinance
[http://perma.cc/LWZ6-URRJ].
239. Hendricks, supra note 238.
240. Id.
241. Melissa Stern, Cyclists, Pedestrians Gain Protection with Passage of Anti-
Harassment Ordinance, FOX4KC.COM (Oct. 7, 2014, 10:55 PM), http://fox4kc.com/2014
/10/07/cyclists-pedestrians-gain-protection-with-passage-of-anti-harassment-ordinance
[http://perma.cc/7PLY-ML2H].
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personal safety.242 Yet much like their tort law counterparts, current
criminal law frameworks largely fail to account for the unique char-
acteristics of street harassment.243 For this reason, an effective way
to prevent and address street harassment would be to incorporate it
into a new criminal law, much like the one adopted on the municipal
level in Kansas City.
A law prohibiting street harassment may serve an “expressive
function” by signaling that public harassment of women will no longer
be tolerated as a social norm.244 As has happened with other existing
violence-prevention laws,245 outlawing street harassment would con-
vey a public disapproval of the behavior in an attempt to deter its
occurrence. It would reframe the issue and upset the status quo by
declaring that street harassment is a social problem worthy of the
legal system’s attention and not merely a problem between individual
harassers and their targets.246
Cities and states already regulate many kinds of public space
behaviors, but very few have ordinances against street harassment.247
A law against street harassment could take the same form as other
state or municipality regulations on public space behavior in terms
of offense level and punishment. Bowman provides a framework from
which states and localities could model a criminal law approach
to street harassment.248 She proposes a model statute that makes
street harassment a misdemeanor, punishable by a $250 fine.249 Her
proposed statute excludes the harasser’s intent and the woman’s
242. “[P]ursuing legal strategies can be seen as just a more formal way of confronting
sexual harassment. By naming the harasser’s behavior as sexual harassment, assert-
ing . . . women’s legal rights, and holding the harasser publicly accountable for his actions,
[the law] accomplish[es] many of the same objectives as direct, verbal confrontation.”
Chalfie, supra note 128, at 340; see also Chhun, supra note 4, at 291 (noting that defend-
ing oneself against catcalls may anger the harasser and escalate his aggressive behavior);
Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 195 (supporting the notion that direct confrontation of
a harasser may endanger the target).
243. Tuerkheimer, supra note 11, at 199.
244. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2024–25 (1996) (arguing that law may make a statement “designed to change social
norms”).
245. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (addressing domestic and sexual
violence perpetrated against women); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 16901 (2006) (enacted as a response to “vicious attacks [against children] by
violent predators . . . .”).
246. See Kennedy, supra note 188, at 1324.
247. There are examples of regulations imposed by municipalities include ordinances
prescribing the rules for dog control, bicycling, and pedestrian traffic. Benard & Schlaffer,
supra note 8, at 70.
248. Bowman, supra note 1, at 575.
249. Id.
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appearance from the elements of the offense and provides examples
of language and gestures that would be unlawful.250
While Bowman’s suggested statute provides a valuable starting
point for legislatures to address street harassment, a better approach
might be for legislatures to categorize the offense as a violation (or
the jurisdictional equivalent), similar to a traffic offense, rather than
a misdemeanor. Doing so would prevent those convicted under the
statute from experiencing the aftereffects and collateral consequences
of a criminal conviction.251 The purpose of an anti-street harassment
ordinance should not be to shame or harm harassers, but instead to
change social norms about the appropriate treatment of women, re-
duce the power imbalance between the sexes, and make women safer
and more welcome in public spaces. A criminal sanction at the level
of a traffic offense effectuates this goal by formally condemning street
harassment while minimizing the social and economic harm that
criminal convictions can create for offenders.
In addition, a more socially responsible punishment for street
harassment than the one proposed by Bowman might be to impose
a fine that is not a fixed flat rate but is instead proportional to the
offender’s ability to pay. If a person convicted under an anti-street
harassment statute could not pay the applicable fine, he would
likely be incarcerated for a period of time.252 Incarceration generally
threatens family253 and economic stability254 for offenders, and since
250. Id. at 575–76. The model language encompasses the various forms of street harass-
ment discussed in Part I, supra.
251. Periman uses three broad categories to define the collateral consequences of crim-
inal convictions: (1) “impaired access to, or enjoyment of, the ordinary rights and benefits
associated with citizenship or residency, such as voting or driving,” (2) “impaired economic
opportunity,” and (3) “increased severity of sanctions in any subsequent criminal proceed-
ing brought against the offender.” Deborah Periman, The Hidden Impact of a Criminal
Conviction: A Brief Overview of Collateral Consequences in Alaska, UAA JUSTICE CTR.
2 (Dec. 2007), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/occasionalpapers/op01.collateral.pdf [http://
perma.cc/Z7Q2-XZHH].
252. The Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that if an offender makes all rea-
sonable efforts to pay court costs and fines but, through no fault of his own, cannot do
so, the State cannot incarcerate him automatically without determining if alternative
methods of punishment are available. 461 U.S. 660, 671–72 (1983). Notwithstanding this
rule, the American Civil Liberties Union has found an increase in rates of incarceration
for failure to pay fines and court fees. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, In for a Penny:
The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons, ACLU REPORT 5 (Oct. 2010) https://www
.aclu .org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/RW4U-T6A9] [hereinafter
ACLU REPORT].
253. See Creasie Finney Hairston, Family Ties During Imprisonment: Important To
Whom and For What?, 18 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 87, 88 (1991) (noting that both spousal
and parent-child relationships are “vulnerable during incarceration.”).
254. See Becky Pettit & Christopher J. Lyons, Incarceration and the Legitimate Labor
Market: Examining Age-Graded Effects on Employment and Wages, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
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American prisons are already overcrowded,255 there seems to be little
to be gained from incarcerating more people for failure to pay court-
ordered fines.256 A fine proportional to a harasser’s ability to pay
would ensure that the punitive and deterrent functions of the crimi-
nal law address the harm caused by the harasser’s behavior by impos-
ing some cost on that behavior. A proportional fine would accomplish
this function without creating additional harm for the offender or
increasing the incarcerated population.
Ending street harassment through the use of criminal law would
not be without its challenges.257 First, average citizens may be unwill-
ing to support legal restrictions on speech.258 They may oppose legal
regulation because they do not feel that street harassment is a prob-
lem, or, even if they do feel it is a problem, because they do not feel
addressing it is a good use of the legal system’s time and resources.259
They may also be wary of additional law enforcement involvement
in the lives of everyday citizens.260 Second, the under-representation
of women in legislative bodies,261 may impact legislative impetus to
725, 746 (2009) (“incarceration appears to have important consequences for employment
and wage outcomes regardless of when individuals are admitted to prison.”).
255. In 2013, more than 2.2 million adults were incarcerated in state and federal prisons
in the United States. Lauren E. Glaze & Danielle Kaeble, Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2013, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [http://perma.cc/G678-57C8]. Seventeen states have a prison
population that exceeds the capacity of state prison facilities. Reid Wilson, Prisons in These
17 States Are Over Capacity, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/20/prisons-in-these-17-states-are-filled-over-capacity
[http://perma.cc/5NLQ-4TAQ].
256. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 252, at 9 (noting that incarcerating those who fail
to pay fines further “diminishes [the offender’s] ability” to pay his debts).
257. Bowman, supra note 1, at 571–72 (explaining the various difficulties of approaching
street harassment through existing criminal sanctions).
258. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 97 (noting that only 12 percent of survey respondents
“favored legal regulation” of racist and sexist speech in public, despite a much higher
percentage reporting a belief that these types of speech are problematic).
259. Id. at 97.
260. Id.
261. Women hold only 19.4 percent of seats in the 114th United States Congress. Of
the 100 Senate seats, women hold just 20, and of the 435 seats in the House of Represen-
tatives, women occupy a mere 84. CENTER FOR AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS, Fact
Sheet: Women in Elective Office 2015, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office
-2015 [http://perma.cc/F6BH-4YSY]. Women are also dramatically under-represented in
state legislatures, holding only 24.2 percent of state legislative seats nationwide. NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Women in State Legislatures for 2014 (Apr. 1,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women
-in-state-legislatures-for-2014.aspx [http://perma.cc/VPA7-ADDL]. Three of the six states
with the six largest cities have a higher percentage of women in their state legislatures
than the national average, including Arizona (35.6 percent), California (26.7 percent), and
Illinois (31.1 percent). Three have percentages lower than the national average: Texas
(21.5 percent), Pennsylvania (17.8 percent), and New York (21.1 percent). Id. See also
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pass anti-street harassment regulations. As previously noted, be-
cause men are highly unlikely to experience street harassment as
targets,262 male legislators may, at a minimum, underestimate the
impact that a legislative response could have in reducing the behav-
ior, or, worse, may not deem the problem worthy of a legislative re-
sponse at all.263
Third, any legislative response to street harassment will likely
face vehement opposition on First Amendment grounds.264 Those
who object to government regulation of speech may argue that street
harassment is of concern only to individuals who are harassed, not to
the broader community, or that it is a “minor inconvenience . . . that
[is] momentarily annoying.” 265 But as discussed in Part III.A, a vari-
ety of recognized exceptions to the First Amendment’s free speech
clause could apply to criminal prohibitions on street harassment that
would protect such statutes from First Amendment scrutiny.266
Fourth, as with civil remedies, the anonymous nature of harasser-
target interactions may render it difficult for women to press crimi-
nal charges against the men who street harass them.267 This may,
however, be remedied (at least in part) through observations of law
enforcement officials, who may intervene when they observe harass-
ment in progress. The presence of law enforcement may itself prevent
street harassment: deterrence theory would suggest if criminal lia-
bility were to attach to the act, harassers might refrain from engag-
ing in the behavior in the presence of police, where punishment would
theoretically be more certain.268
Another serious concern with criminalizing street harassment
is the disproportionate impact that approach may have on racial
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated
Places of 50,000 or More, Ranked by July 1, 2013 Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1,
2013—United States—Places of 50,000+ Population (May 2014), http://factfinder.census
.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [http://perma.cc/JSE8
-GYE4]. This is significant because street harassment is most likely to occur in urban
environments, so a legislative response to the problem might be most needed in those
states. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 529.
262. Women may and sometimes do harass men. GARDNER, supra note 6, at 14, 15.
This, however, is not the typical street harassment dynamic. See Kissling, supra note 50,
at 453 (discussing some of the male-female dynamics of street harassment); Laniya,
supra note 12, at 101.
263. KEARL, supra note 12, at 28; Heben, supra note 4, at 207.
264. See, e.g., NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 112 (noting that survey respondents frequently
objected to legal restrictions on “offensive public speech.”).
265. Id. at 30.
266. Thompson, supra note 7, at 338.
267. See Franks, supra note 80, at 582.
268. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST.
199, 201 (2013) (noting that substantial evidence supports the idea that increased police
visibility can deter criminal behavior by increasing the perceived risk of apprehension).
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minorities.269 Because of heavier policing of minority communities,270
we should be concerned with the prospect that law enforcement will
disproportionately target men of color when enforcing any street ha-
rassment regulations.271 The liberation of women from the oppressive
nature of street harassment should not come at the cost of oppres-
sion of racial minorities, particularly when minorities are already
over-represented in criminal processing.272
CONCLUSIONS
Every day in the United States, women experience a form of
gender-based oppression when men they do not know call out to
them on the street.273 Though street harassment encounters vary in
severity of both the harasser’s behavior and the risk of physical harm
to the target, street harassment inflicts serious personal and social
harms every time it occurs.274 Most important of these is the reinforce-
ment of a gender-based power hierarchy, which is underscored each
time a man feels entitled to comment publicly on a strange woman’s
body, sexuality, or mere presence in public space.275 As they currently
exist, civil and criminal legal remedies largely fail to address this
form of abuse.276 For this reason, states and localities should enact
legislation outlawing street harassment in its various forms. Such
legislation would likely withstand First Amendment scrutiny,277 and
269. See Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1185–86 (2011) (arguing that higher arrest and incarceration rates in minority commu-
nities result from police departments’ discretion in a variety of areas, including putting
police in particular communities, a practice known as “geographic deployment”).
270. Id.
271. Proving that this phenomenon has taken place would be difficult for most defen-
dants. To prevail on a selective enforcement claim, a defendant must show that “similarly
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not . . . .” United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). Selective enforcement claims rarely succeed
because this is a difficult standard to meet. Sekhon, supra note 269, at 1184.
272. For example, approximately 13 percent of the United States population identifies
as Black, yet 40 percent of the incarcerated population is Black. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
State & County QuickFacts: USA (2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000
.html [http://perma.cc/6AQK-5YX6]; Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration
in the 2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [http://perma
.cc/RD6K-SCVM].
273. Bowman, supra note 1, at 522–23 (describing the commonality of street harassment
and its various forms).
274. Id. at 524 (describing the effects of street harassment on the target).
275. See Berdahl, supra note 14, at 645 (noting that sex-based harassment may result
from a motivation to preserve the gender hierarchy).
276. Bowman, supra note 1, at 571–72 (concluding that current legal approaches to
curbing street harassment are largely failing).
277. Thompson, supra note 7, at 338.
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would serve the expressive function of condemning these uniquely
harassing behaviors. Because certain issues may arise with criminal
sanctioning of this type,278 any criminal sanction should account for
the social and collateral consequences of conviction and should seek
to minimize harm to the offender. Nevertheless, reform is necessary
because the current state of the law grossly under-appreciates the
harms experienced by women when they are street harassed, as well
as the social harms perpetrated when men exert power over women
in this way.
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